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Introduction
In 1980, estimated federal support for higher education in the US totaled approximately
$55-billion.3  By 1999 that figure had swelled to just over $88-billion even though federal on-
budget4 support for postsecondary education actually fell during this time from $22.2-billion to
$18.2-billion.  What largely stimulated the growth were policy shifts on two different fronts: a
significant commitment by the federal government for tuition support and, to a lesser extent,
institutional support vis-à-vis research.  Indirect support in the form of student aid rose in real
terms by $23.1 billion while appropriations for academic research grew by $7.6 billion.
In the face of increasing federal support for higher education, public concerns that
colleges and universities cared little about containing costs and increasing productivity continued
to grow.  Institutions were raising tuition while students and their families were shouldering
greater portions of financing a collegiate education.  At the same time universities embarked on
billion dollar capital campaigns and lobbied state governments for greater annual appropriations
in the name of maintaining existing levels of quality.  In 1997 when the National Commission on
the Cost of Higher Education (NCCHE)5 released the tentative results of their study into the
nature of college costs, much to the dismay of lawmakers and the general public, the panel
concluded that for the most part American higher education was actually a bargain.  As one
panel member noted, “there is a lot wrong with higher education…but the one thing colleges
can’t be accused of is gouging the public” (Anderson cited in Burd, 1997).
For the most part, public concerns with higher education costs and productivity seem to
have been sparked by three converging forces: demand-side cost escalation, a depressed
economy, and a shift in the burden of financing a college education toward students and their
families.  When the public, and eventually legislators, began seriously looking at why it cost so
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much to send their children to college their initial perceptions were already tempered by largely
negative images of university education.  Books like Charles Sykes’ Profscam (1988) inflamed
public opinion with anecdotal stories of professors only teaching late-morning classes and
frequently missing office hours.  In doing so they (professors) could devote more time to the
activities they truly enjoyed: collaborating with their more intellectual graduate students in their
departments and focusing on relatively obscure research like “Evolution of the Potholder: From
Technology to Popular Art” (p. 102).  At the same time, the picture put forth of undergraduate
education was of students crammed into 500-person lecture halls being taught by non-native
speakers of English.  As tuition continued to rise, especially at private institutions, public
institutions continued to seek greater levels of state appropriations.  It seemed obvious to infer
that universities were productively inefficient and cared little about containing costs.
The often complex nature of advancing and transferring knowledge made it difficult for
those in the academy to dispel negative perceptions even with studies showing faculty members
at public research universities working on average over 55 hours per week (Jordan, 1994).  In
response, the past decade has borne witness to an outpouring of literature within the academy on
cost-containment and increasing productivity in higher education.  Guided largely by cost
escalation theories with names like “cost disease,” the “revenue theory of cost” (Bowen, 1980),
and the “administrative lattice and academic ratchet” (Massy and Zemsky, 1994) an underlying
tone persists that universities care little, if at all, about issues of efficiency in lieu of direct
oversight or externally-imposed incentives.
Yet any approach seeking answers to questions of institutional productivity and costs
must eventually address the technical aspects with which universities convert inputs into outputs
as well as how the market prices of those inputs influence resource allocation decisions.
However, the response to the NCCHE report suggests that to this day the cost structure of
American higher education remains something of an enigma to both policymakers and the
public.  Nor do the images of university behavior put forth by Charles Sykes adequately capture
the technical aspects with which universities utilize their academic labor inputs, like faculty and
graduate students, to jointly produce undergraduate education and research.
In spite of popular perceptions that colleges and universities do not pursue efficient
production or cost practices, a review of the literature reveals remarkably little empirical
evidence to either support or refute assertions of cost and productive inefficiency at research
universities. Two of the most commonly used estimation techniques in the study of higher
education institutions, production and cost functions, implicitly assume efficient behavior.  Of
the few studies found that specifically assess efficient production in US higher education
institutions, the variety of approaches and differing choices of input and output measures
suggests little consensus over how to appropriately and comprehensively capture productive or
cost efficiency, much less both.
Coupled with the dearth of empirical studies is little evidence for any theory to guide
efforts at measuring efficiency.  In terms of the economic literature, theories of nonprofits tend to
focus on why these institutions form rather than on behavioral aspects.  Hypotheses assert that a
lack of market mechanisms and preferences over using particular input combinations prohibit
efficient behavior.  However, when comparing non-profits’ cost functions with similar, for-profit
firms, surveys of the literature conclude that the empirical evidence is inconsistent as to whether
non-profits are any less allocatively or technically efficient.  At the same time, while economic
models of nonprofit behavior vary in their formulation, the equilibrium conditions derived in
these models suggest non-profits can exhibit efficient behavior.
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It is this gap between perceptions of productive and cost inefficiency and inconclusive
theoretical and empirical research to verify such claims that motivates the research question
posed in this study:
In terms of academic labor inputs,6 to what extent are research-intensive universities
technically and allocatively efficient in the joint production of education and research?
Outline of the study
Chapter 2 is divided into four main sections.  The first outlines the economics behind the
four types of efficiency measures considered in this study: technical, scale, allocative, and
overall efficiency.  In addition it pays explicit attention to demonstrating the extent to which each
is inter-related to the others.  The second section characterizes academic labor inputs and the
sometime distinct ways in which research universities allocate those inputs to jointly produce the
outputs “education” and “research.”  Building on the discussion in section 2, the third section
develops a simple prestige-maximizing model of university behavior7 by integrating three
concepts: a) what the author calls Burton Clark’s (1995) “taxonomy” of education, b) observed
academic labor input allocations, and c) the necessary economic conditions for productive and
cost efficiency.  In doing so the model builds on work by Winston (1997) and Hoxby (1997) and
attempts to explain why research universities may choose to engage in efficient behavior as well
as where potential inefficiencies may arise.  In the last section of chapter 2, data envelopment
analysis (DEA) as an empirical approach to testing institutional efficiency is discussed.  A linear
programming technique that essentially “envelops” the observed data (thereby creating a
relatively efficient frontier), DEA is a reasonably restriction-free approach to measuring the
efficiency of firms using similar inputs to produce similar outputs.  Based on a review of the
literature, the author concludes that DEA, in spite of its inherent limitations, possesses several
desirable properties that make it suitable not only for studying efficiency, but particularly higher
education efficiency.  Moreover, it is shown that the input and output weights derived in DEA
analyses can be useful for estimating important economic measures such as the marginal
productivity of inputs and the marginal transformation between outputs.
Chapter 3 describes the methodological aspects of the study.  The population of interest is
those institutions defined by the 1994 Carnegie Classification system as Research Universities or
Doctoral Universities.  Data availability permitted analysis of 183 institutions during the 1993
academic year, or approximately 75% of the population.  In an effort to control for differing
input and output quality across universities, two “tiers” were created and institutions were only
assessed relative to others in their tier.8  In addition, the statistical analyses of the findings
controlled for both “form of control” and the presence of “medical facilities.”
                                                
6 The academic human capital universities employ to produce education and research, including faculty members,
graduate teaching and research assistants
7 Briefly the model posits that universities choose to maximize the production of education and research and that
they derive prestige from the outputs directly.  See James (1990).
8 The two tiers were constructed by first sorting all 183 institutions in descending order based on the National
Research Council’s “mean scholarly quality of program faculty” indicator from their 1993 publication Assessment
of research-doctorate programs in the United States.  From this, the first tier consisted of the top 68 institutions, the
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Empirically testing the different notions of efficiency outlined in chapter 2 requires three
vectors of data (inputs, relative input prices, and outputs) of which there are a total of 10
variables.  Table 1.1 lists the individual components for each of the three vectors.
Table 1.1 – Input/Output Vectors and Associated
Variables






2. Graduate Teaching Assistants
3. Graduate Research Assistants
Input Prices: 1. Faculty Wages
2. Graduate Assistantship Wages
a. Teaching Assistants
b. Research Assistants
Data for the input and output measures was obtained from multiple sources including the
National Center for Education Statistics’ IPEDS database, the National Science Foundation’s
Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering, the Institute for
Scientific Information’s Citation Indexes, the National Research Council’s Assessment of
research-doctorate programs in the United States, and the University of Nebraska at Lincoln’s
National survey of graduate stipends, graduate fellowships, and postdoctoral fellowships.  From
the various data sources, input and output measures were computed and derived for analysis.
Data limitations restricted the ability to jointly analyze technical and allocative efficiency
to only 35 public institutions that were almost exclusively from Tier 2.  As such, a second
analysis was conducted on all institutions in both tiers that focused only on technical and scale
efficiency.
The remainder of chapter 3 is devoted to the methodological aspects of DEA and presents
a brief mathematical treatment of the different efficiency measures computed as well as a
discussion of the analytical techniques employed in the study.  Based loosely on Byrnes and
Valdmanis’ (1994) study of non-profit hospitals, the DEA approach used in the study derives the
radial efficiency measures listed in Table 1.2:9
                                                                                                                                                            
“prestigious” universities, and the second tier consisted of the remaining 115.  Throughout the paper these Tier 1 is
referred to as “high quality institutions” and Tier 2 as “other institutions.”
9 It is important to note that the derived efficiency measures are relative, and not absolute, measures of efficiency.
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Table 1.2 – Various efficiency measures calculated
in DEA analyses10
Overall inefficiency: 1. Technical inefficiency
a. Variable returns to scale (VRS)
b. Constant returns to scale (CRS)
2. Scale inefficiency
a. Increasing returns to scale (IRS)
b. Decreasing returns to scale (DRS)
3.   Allocative inefficiency
The analysis in Chapter 4 is disaggregated into two parts.  The first presents the
calculated technical and scale efficiency scores for the two tiers and proceeds to test whether any
statistically significant differences exist between the distributions of, and the mean efficiency
scores for, the two tiers.  The analysis then proceeds to test whether the confounding variables
(i.e. form of control and the presence of medical facilities) are likely to affect the efficiency
scores.  As noted earlier, because certain data was not available for all institutions the second
analysis involved developing measures of overall, technical, and allocative efficiency for 35
public institutions.
Results
The results of the variable returns to scale technical efficiency analyses indicate that, on
average, Tier 1 (Tier 2) institutions are approximately 93% (86%) efficient at allocating their
academic labor compared to the “best practice” institutions in the respective tier groups.
As institutions are grouped to account for variations in output and input quality, the
statistically different mean efficiency scores between the groups suggest that “high-quality”
institutions, on average, are likely to be operating closer to best practice universities in their tier
than the other institutions.  When the distributions of efficiency scores for the two tiers are
                                                
10 Overall efficiency is calculated as the product of technical and allocative efficiency.  Scale efficiency can be
regarded as a form, or specific type, of technical efficiency.  The VRS (variable returns to scale) and CRS (constant
returns to scale) distinction under the technical efficiency heading represents the scale assumption invoked in that
particular model.  For example, assuming CRS (VRS) means that the researcher assumes the absence (presence) of
scale inefficiencies.  Both models were run in order to estimate whether scale inefficient institutions were operating
at increasing or decreasing returns to scale.
08/13/02 6
compared to each other, the difference between tiers is shown to be statistically different.  Tier 1
institutions are more likely to be classified as technically efficient or clustered near the
constructed efficient frontier.  Two out of every three institutions in the higher quality tier are at
least 90% technically efficient compared to just less than half of Tier 2 institutions and more than
4 of every 5 Tier 1 institutions is at least 80% efficient compared to 2 of every 3 institutions in
Tier 2.
Form of institutional control (public or private) is shown to not affect technical efficiency
scores.  For both groups, public institutions are just as likely to be situated on the efficient
frontier as privates.  However, when the presence of medical facilities is considered, technical
efficiency scores are shown to differ for Tier 1.  Institutions without medical facilities are almost
twice as likely to be considered technically efficient than those with.
In terms of scale efficiencies, institutions in Tier 1 (Tier 2) are shown to be, on average,
95% (91%) efficient at operating on a scale consistent with long-term equilibrium (the case of
constant returns to scale – CRS).  The difference between the mean scale efficiency scores for
the two tiers is also shown to be statistically significant.  Compared to the most scale efficient
institutions in each quality group, high quality institutions are more likely to operating at a level
consistent with constant returns to scale than other institutions.  Considering the nature of scale
inefficiencies, there are no statistically significant differences between tiers and in both groups
more institutions are likely to be operating at increasing returns to scale than decreasing.
When form of institutional control is accounted for, the results suggest that publics are
just as likely to be regarded as scale efficient as privates in both tiers.  However, when the
presence of medical facilities is considered, scale efficiency scores are shown to differ for Tier 2.
Only one medical institution in Tier 2 was classified as scale efficient (3% of all medical
institutions in Tier 2) versus 16 without (20% of all nonmedical institutions).  Moreover,
institutions with medical facilities are shown to be more likely than those without to be the least
scale efficient.
Considering efficiency as the joint product of technical and allocative components for a
sample of public institutions, the results show public institutions to be 77% efficient overall.
When this score is decomposed into technical and allocative efficiencies, approximately half of
the overall inefficiency is attributable to each component under the assumption of constant
returns to scale.  The institutions in the sample are shown to be, on average, 89% efficient in
choosing an input-minimizing mix of academic labor, and 87% efficient at choosing an input
bundle that is cost minimizing.  When individual institutions’ scores are examined, 9 institutions
were shown to be using a technically efficient input-mix but of these, only four picked a bundle
that also minimized academic labor costs.
Select Discussion
Overall, the results from this study are consistent with the model of university behavior
outlined in the framework for analysis section of chapter 2.  There it was argued that competition
in the input markets for high quality students should act as an incentive to universities employing
those inputs to engage in more efficient production behavior.  With regards to technical
efficiency, Tier 1 institutions are shown to be, on average, just under 93% efficient and Tier 2
institutions approximately 86%.  The statistically significant difference between the mean
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technical efficiency scores supports that claim and finds further support in the distributions of
scores, which were also shown to be statistically different between tiers.  Whereas 67% of Tier 1
efficiency scores fell between 90% and 100%, over half (56%) of the efficiency scores for Tier 2
were below 80%.  Less variability and a higher mean efficiency score for Tier 1 both support the
notion that competition for high quality inputs acts as an incentive to use those inputs more
efficiently in the face of scarce resources.
Additional evidence can be found by looking only at those institutions the DEA analysis
identified as being technically efficient.  If there is a greater degree of substitutability between
high quality graduate students and faculty members, it would be evident in lower marginal rates
of technical substitution (RTS) between inputs relative to those computed for Tier 2.  An RTS
value of -1 between inputs indicates they are perfect substitutes at that point on the isoquant.
The further the RTS deviates from this (either positively or negatively) implies more (less) of
one input would have to be added if the amount of the other input were reduced by one unit.
If one assumes, at the margin, that the production of education is additively separable11
then summing the marginal productivities of faculty in the production of all three education
outputs provides some measure of the marginal productivity of faculty to the production of the
more general output education.  These summary RTS measures were calculated in chapter 4.  For
Tier 1, the mean RTS between faculty and research assistants was –1.50 and between faculty and
teaching assistants it was –1.37.  For tier 2, the values were –2.0 and –1.8 respectively.  In both
cases, the mean RTS measures for Tier 1 are closer to –1 that that for Tier 2, indicating both
teaching and research assistants at institutions using higher quality inputs are more likely to be
regarded as substitutes for faculty labor relative to other institutions.  This result however, has to
be considered in light of the fact that DEA does not permit statistical testing of the results, hence
it is not possible to say with any statistical certainty that the differences between the RTS values
are different than zero.  Moreover, this relationship is dependent on whether the additive
separability assumption holds.  Nonetheless, the general finding regarding quality differences
and efficiency is important because it offers empirical support linking the two ideas.  This
relationship has not been addressed or estimated in prior studies of higher education efficiency
and thus represents an important result.
A final observation that can be drawn from the technical efficiency results concerns the
extent to which institutions are efficient in the joint production of education and research.  In the
discussion from chapter 2 on the economics of technical efficiency, it was shown that technical
efficiency in a two-output case requires the RTS values between inputs be the same in the
production of all outputs.  There is partial evidence to support this based on the calculated RTS
values for the institutions found to be relatively efficient in each tier.  For both tiers the
calculated RTS values are reasonably close to each other (–1.50 and –1.37 for Tier 1; -2.00 and -
1.8 for Tier 2).  However, in the absence of statistical tests to determine whether the difference is
significant, it is not possible to draw further conclusions.
The findings from the scale efficiency analyses provide additional evidence to support
other researchers’ findings with regard to how competitive forces shape higher education
institutions.  Geiger and Feller (1995) for example show that the historically pre-eminent
research universities were not able to maintain their share of total academic research
                                                
11 Additive separability implies that the marginal productivity in producing one of the outputs does not change when
increasing or decreasing the amount produced of another output.  A case can be made that adding a single student to
an undergraduate course is not likely to influence the marginal productivity of faculty to the production of other
education outputs.
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expenditures during the 1980s.  One reason they suggest is that the characteristics making them
prestigious12 limited their ability to expand during a decade marked by increased overall funding
for research.  These institutions had already maximized much of their productive capacity.  As
evidence, they present figures showing that institutions experiencing the greatest gains in
research share were those which expanded their number of full professors by more than the
average while those experiencing the greatest loss expanded by less.
This pattern is also evident in the results presented here.  Institutions that have already
maximized their productive capacity should, at the least, not be operating at increasing returns to
scale.  Of the 14 institutions in Tier 1 that were also among the greatest losers of research share
in the Geiger and Feller study, only two are shown to be operating at increasing returns.  In
contrast institutions that have room to grow should either be operating at increasing returns or be
at constant returns, given that there is a three-year gap between the last year in their data and that
used here.  Only two of the institutions among those exhibiting the greatest gains in research
share are shown to be operating at decreasing returns. 13
In terms of overall and allocative efficiencies, the results show a sample of Tier 2 public
institutions operating at 77% and 87% respectively.  The usefulness of these figures are limited
though as data limitations did not permit comparisons between groups and the number of
institutions analyzed was small, which increases the likelihood that the frontier would be altered
significantly by including more institutions.  However, presenting the results does highlight how
useful this type of analysis can be for testing assertions regarding non-profit behavior.
Disaggregating inputs into their physical and cost components allows researchers to consider
whether institutions may be efficient at allocating physical inputs even if cost efficiency is not
sought or achieved.  Higher education is an industry whose institutions’ goals differ considerably
from the cost-conscious, profit-maximizing firms guiding economic notions of efficiency.  If
universities are going to be productively efficient, it will more likely emerge then in the
allocation of their physical inputs and not costs.  To not consider this in an empirical analysis is a
serious omission, yet the literature review conducted for this study revealed no instances where
efficiency was considered or tested in such a manner.  In this respect, the results from the
analysis show how disaggregating inputs into physical and cost components makes it possible to
evaluate whether physical input allocations stemming from non-cost-related objectives may
conflict with cost-minimizing objectives.
An example of this can be found in the discussion of the non-profit literature from
chapter 1.  One of the three assertions put forth about non-profit behavior was that non-profits
might possess preferences over using particular input combinations that would result in higher
cost curves.  To empirically test an assertion such as this first requires separating physical input
usage from costs and evaluating whether technical efficiency is being achieved but not cost
efficiency.  Focusing exclusively on only one type of efficiency (e.g. technical) does not permit
one to test this type of hypothesis, nor does using cost-based input measures.
In this study the findings indicate only about half of the overall inefficiency is actually
cost-related.  These results are far from conclusive but suggest, at least for these institutions, that
cost-containment may not be a primary goal.  Moreover, if it was the case that institutions were
driven to efficiently minimize physical input usage instead, then disaggregating overall
                                                
12 The authors define the most prestigious institutions as being “characterized by low turnover, a relatively large
number of senior faculty, and a high percentage of full professors” (p. 22).
13 Assuming institutions with scale efficiency scores above 99% are also operating at constant returns to scale.  If
not the numbers change to 3 and 4 institutions respectively.
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efficiency should reveal cost inefficiency to be the main source of overall inefficiency, which it
does not.
There are several compelling reasons to cast doubt over the validity of these results or
whether they can be generalized beyond the group being evaluated.  The number of institutions
analyzed is comparably small (35) and are mostly doctoral-granting universities operating in
what can be called regional markets.  Had the data been available, it would have been preferable
to analyze cost behavior from institutions in Tier 1 instead.  Those institutions are not only more
likely to operate in competitive input and output markets, but because they also tend to attract
resources from a larger geographic pool, regional differences would not factor as heavily into the
analysis.  From the technical efficiency analysis comparing Tiers 1 and 2, it was shown how the
distribution of efficiency scores in the latter was likely to be more dispersed.  Moreover, because
the group consisted only of public institutions from a variety of different states, no accounting is
made for the effects of different state regulations such as the performance-based funding
mechanisms in Tennessee and South Carolina.  James (1990), for example, notes that one of the
main distinctions between public and private institutions is the decrease in institutional autonomy
publics face as a tradeoff to the stability of annual state appropriations.  Because state legislators
have what James calls “monopsonistic power [to] specify certain inputs and outputs that must be
met” (p. 89) it could be that the efficiency scores here reflect inefficient physical or cost-based
allocations stemming from state regulations.
While the actual results are severely limited in their descriptive ability, the analysis itself
demonstrates another instance where DEA has value as an analytical tool.  Specifically, the
designs of prior higher education efficiency studies were not capable of jointly estimating
overall, technical, and allocative efficiency.  In this respect, what was done here represents a
significant departure from past approaches and reveals how DEA may be used for testing
hypotheses regarding non-profit behavior.
Conclusion
This study provides a much needed empirical perspective on productive and cost
efficiency in higher education institutions.  At the same time, what has been done here only
scratches the surface of a topic that has historically been neglected yet is critically important to
gaining a stronger theoretical understanding of production and cost behavior in higher education
institutions in general.  While much research still needs to be done, this study represents a solid
step in the right direction.
The reason for this can be found in the development of an economic rationale for why
universities may strive to be efficient and how inefficiencies may arise in the process.  It is not
enough to incorporate traditional measures of higher education inputs and outputs into a DEA
analysis and simply interpret the results.  Understanding whether efficiency is even a rational
expectation of university production, much less what factors may give rise to it, requires
forethought about the underlying production process.  By taking such an approach in this study
and outlining a plausible framework for analysis, it was possible to do more than just identify
relevant input and output measures and to generate relative efficiency scores.  Being able to
corroborate the results with more general observations on higher education production provides
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evidence that there is more to gain by attempting to understand why inefficiency occurs rather
than just measuring it.
In chapter 1, a gap was identified between perceptions of university efficiency and
empirical evidence to support such claims.  What has been done here “closes” that gap to some
extent by providing empirical results that reveal how concepts like quality, competition, form of
control, and the presence of medical schools are associated or influence efficient behavior in
research universities.  To that end, though absolute measures of higher education efficiency
continue to elude, this study does succeed in shedding new light on important relationships that
arise and should be taken into account when evaluating higher education efficiency.
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